Desmond M. Connor

The Victoria Eaton's Centre:

The Dynamics of Heritage and
Change in Urban Redevelopment

Desmond M. Connor

Introduction
Victoria, the City of Gardens, nestles on the warm southern shores of Vancouver Island and nurtures the ambiance of Olde England for the enjoyment of both residents and tourists. The city proper, with a population of about 64,000, is one of five municipalities occupying the lower Saanich peninsula; together they comprise Greater Victoria which has a total population of some 250,000 people.

As in many North American urban areas, the city constitutes the older core of an expanding metropolitan area; in the recent past, the greater part of regional growth has taken place in the suburbs. Between 1941 and 1981, the city's proportion of the regional population declined from 59% to 20%. During the last 10 years, the growth of suburban shopping centres has led to a relative decline in the city's share of regional retail expenditures of 2% per year down to 42% in 1986.

Eaton's Needs
One of Canada's major retail department store chains, Eaton's had occupied much of two central blocks of downtown since 1948; its retail facilities were housed in a collection of 10 buildings, some dating back to 1893, with a variety of floor heights, bay widths and finishes. Of the total area of 300,000 square feet, only 200,000 square feet was fully usable for retail purposes. A new and efficient store was deemed vital by Eaton's management to enable it to improve its performance and also to re-assert its leadership as the principal retail magnet for the downtown business community.

As one of the foremost urban developers in North America, the Cadillac Fairview Corporation has carried out many urban redevelopment projects, some involving sites with historic values and several in partnership with Eaton's. Eaton's and Cadillac Fairview concluded that, to provide Eaton's with a new store and to create a retail anchor for downtown Victoria, an integrated retail complex of some 420,000 square feet of leasable area was required.

The Public Program
Introducing a redevelopment project of this scale into a city like Victoria is clearly a considerable undertaking. It can only be accomplished if the sponsors are willing and able to gain a comprehensive understanding of the community, work as constructively as they can with the many interested parties, and shape the project to suit the desires of the community as far as possible.

Our basic strategy for preventing and resolving public controversy about major projects is to identify those who stand to benefit from a proposal as well as those opposed to it and to involve all - developer, beneficiaries, opponents and regulatory bodies - in a mutual education and joint problem solving process. This includes identifying the relative merits and disadvantages of a project from the perspective of each relevant party and working with each of them to develop generally acceptable yet workable compromise solutions for the various issues.

Public Program Goals
In our written proposal to Cadillac Fairview on June 12, 1986, we defined the objective of the public program as:

"To provide opportunities for the people of Victoria, primarily the residents of the City of Victoria, to obtain information about the proposed development and contribute their comments and suggestions so that the final proposal will be technically sound, economically attractive, generally understood and accepted by most of those affected and will thus be politically viable."
Our company has pioneered this approach to participative planning and decision-making during the past 20 years and has demonstrated it in more than 175 projects across Canada. In this case, the public information and consultation program was developed in three phases - concept, design and decision - which are outlined below.

Concept Phase
The basic strategy at the outset is, first, to gain a sound appreciation of the community and its various publics and, second, to inform as many people as possible about the general concept of the project and identify their questions and concerns about it as input to the design team.

The principal elements of the public program for this phase were:

  1. To prepare a social profile of Greater Victoria to orient the Toronto-based developer and the Vancouver-based architects to the nature and characteristics of this community, e.g. key local issues, roles of various organizations, knowledge of and attitudes to the developer and the project. (Note: detailed descriptions of the social profile and other techniques, together with case studies illustrating their use, are available in our Resource Book noted at the conclusion of this article.)

  2. To publish a display advertisement outlining the proposal, acknowledging community concerns, indicating the planning schedule, inviting those interested to attend the forthcoming open houses and soliciting public response through a tear-off coupon. This coupon asked whether or not people supported the proposal in principle, requested their comments, questions and suggestions and enquired about their interest in receiving a project newsletter.

  3. To hold two Open Houses a week later so that those interested could obtain further information, talk with the design team and register their views on a checklist at the door. Text and graphic panels described the project in more detail and illustrated other downtown redevelopment projects that members of the design team had carried out in Calgary, Edmonton and Washington, D.C.

  4. To convene a one-day planning workshop two weeks later with a dozen representatives of previously identified interest groups - seniors, heritage, tourism, business and other community interests. They reviewed the concept proposal in some detail and reflected on the public response received through the newspaper coupon and the checklist at the Open Houses.

The results of these activities were as follows:

  • The social profile provided a comprehensive overview of the community and its organizations, including the importance of heritage values in a community where the tourism industry is a dominant factor ($250 million annually) and 37% of the population is over 55 years of age. The willingness of most groups to work with the developer was clear, despite the concerns of many that an eastern firm might not be sensitive to maintaining the unique character of Victoria.

  • The newspaper advertisement resulted in the return of 806 coupons - 58% supported the proposal, 11% were undecided and 31% were opposed; 20% opposed any kind of change while a similar proportion noted heritage concerns.

  • The two open houses were visited by some 700 people, with 534 completing the exit checklist - 57% in support, 25% undecided and 18% opposed. Five buildings were identified by the public as having heritage values.

  • The planning workshop was attended by all of the groups invited and generated a generally positive environment for the project, although concluding statements by heritage representatives indicated a commitment to preservation rather than conservation or adaptation.

  • During the first two months, there were 300 column inches of newspaper coverage, two television interviews and numerous radio news items. The telephone hotline, established to enable immediate response, received about 100 calls.

In summary, interested residents made their priorities clear: a project compatible with the present urban environment, e.g. outward facing stores, respect for heritage values and more parking. Both the developer's representative and the chief architect personally read all 800 newspaper coupons and more than 500 exit checklists. The former stated,

"The people of Victoria have made a personal impact on key members of the design team that will be reflected in the emerging more detailed design for the project."
The design team also accepted the fact that public perceptions of the need for additional parking meant that a substantial number of spaces would have to be provided, even though the city by-law and industry standards did not require any.

During August, while the design team worked to incorporate community response into their work on the detailed design, Monday Magazine, an alternative Victoria weekly newspaper, sponsored a forum on "Cadillac Fairview and the Future of Downtown" with presentations by the Mayor and representatives of development, heritage, business and tourism interests.

Also in August, Business Victoria independently commissioned a telephone survey of Victoria by a local market research firm - 87% of the population had heard of the project; of these, 86% supported it and only 14% were undecided or opposed.

Design Phase
The basic strategy at this stage is to develop and present a more detailed design which reflects the public input from the preceding Concept Phase and then to seek comments and suggestions in order to refine the design to a near final form.

A cycle of activities similar to the initial Concept Phase was followed to present the more detailed design of the centre to the public - a display advertisement in mid-September, two Open Houses a week later followed by a planning workshop.

The results were as follows:

  • Of the 343 newspaper coupons, 70% supported the design proposal, 4% were undecided and 26% opposed the project. Comments indicated that 45% offered general support, 20% wanted no change at all, 10% said "Get on with it!" and 4% noted heritage concerns.

  • Of the 550 who visited the Open Houses, 306 completed the exit checklist - 57% indicated support, 21% were undecided and 26% opposed the project. Comments on the proposal included physical design suggestions from 39%; 16% wanted no change at all; 13% gave general support and 10% urged heritage preservation.

  • The planning workshop was again well-attended, generated a productive discussion of remaining issues and concluded with positive statements by a number of organizational representatives. There was general agreement amongst the participants that the design team had responded too fully to earlier demands for a variegated exterior appearance; the proponent agreed to simplify a number of storefronts.

The Downtown Victoria Association, whose members are mostly small businesses, carried out a survey of its 320 members - 92% of the 202 respondents considered the concept important to downtown and 78% felt it would improve their business. However, during the period, ten members resigned in protest over the Association's support of the project.

An analysis of 1,989 coupons and checklists received to date indicated that 1,684 (85%) included both names and addresses; removing 100 who had registered their views more than once the remaining 1,584 residents indicated that 62% supported the project, 15% were undecided and 23% were opposed. Some 1,264 requested the project newsletter, an indication of their continuing interest in the project.

In the 2 months of this phase of the program from August 9 to October 12 the project received over 1,100 column inches of newspaper coverage, two television interviews, numerous radio reports and a major cablevision program.

Interim Conclusions
In reviewing the project at this point, it seemed that:

  • there was substantial, informed and visible support for the proposed Victoria Eaton Centre;

  • interested individuals and organizations had continuing opportunities to obtain information about the project, make suggestions and register their views over a period of four months;

  • it was unlikely that further public activities would generate significantly new or different positions;

  • opposing groups and interests, e.g. heritage, tourism and some business people, were unlikely to change their views on the project.

Decision Phase
The basic strategy in this concluding phase is to present the final project design to as many people as possible and to secure their informed response for presentation to the elected decision-makers. The focus of the program is now on the usually silent majority, many of whom are latent supporters of the proposal, but are intimidated by its articulate opponents. (Axiom: don't expend more than 20% of your resources - time, money, energy, goodwill - directly on the opponents of the project, but stimulate its supporters and encourage them to deal with the opposition.)

The program of work consisted mainly of a multi-media program; all publications contained a response coupon addressed to the Mayor and Council rather than to the design team as had been the case previously. More specifically:

  • a Question and Answer treatment was prepared and published for use at meetings and later as a half page newspaper advertisement;

  • a random sample telephone survey was conducted each month to identify and track the public's awareness, positions and attitudes; cross-tabulations indicated the sources of support and opposition by age, education, occupation and location; the results were summarized in a newsrelease to the media each time;

  • a half-hour cablevision program was arranged; the audience was boosted by radio and newspaper notices;

  • based on the November survey results, half page newspaper advertisements were placed in four community newspapers;

  • the first issue of the Victoria Eaton Centre Newsletter was prepared and distributed to some 2,500 people - 800 supporters who requested it and members of three major business organizations;

  • television coverage took place through appearances by the proponent's representative and the chief architect on a widely-followed talk show and later on a featured news program which included a scale model of the project;

  • finally, just before Council was scheduled to make its decision, a full page newspaper advertisement was published featuring the latest rendering of the project, answers to four key questions and urging the return of a coupon addressed to the Mayor and Council endorsing the proposal.

Note: the telephone hot-line averaged 8-10 telephone calls per day during this period; half were leasing enquiries. Another telephone survey was carried out in early December.

The results included:

  • some 91% of the residents of Greater Victoria had heard of the project, according to the mid-November telephone survey, with 50% supporting it, 41% undecided and 9% opposed. By mid-December, the figures were: 62% support, 22% undecided and 16% opposed;

  • during the six-week period, more than 1,030 column inches of newspaper coverage occurred, plus a further 6 hours of electronic broadcasting; over 2,400 column inches and more than 11 hours of electronic coverage were received during the preceding six months;

  • prior to the crucial Council meeting scheduled for December 11, the Mayor's office received 842 coupons, with 824 (98%) supporting the Victoria Eaton Centre and 18 (2%) against.

At this point, Council's approval of the project would seem to be a foregone conclusion - were it not for the formidable opposition mounted against the project.

The Agony of Approval
During the next three months an unprecedented series of meetings, rallies, legal manoeuvres, debates and protests continued until final Council approval was obtained by a 7-2 vote on March 9, 1987; a further five months was required before development and building permits were finally issued in August.

While the initiative and direction of the public program had been taken by the design team up until this time, the "Save Our City Coalition" was formed in late December, 1986, and developed and implemented an impressive protest movement against the proposed Centre. The Coalition was made up of a variety of people who opposed the project because of heritage concerns, environmental issues, threats to tourism, fears about downtown business impacts and general opposition to change in any form. Both sides of the political spectrum worked together for this common cause.

Among the key events of this period, in chronological order, were:

  • an eight-hour Council meeting on December 18-19 which, at 3:45 a.m., voted approval in principle of the project by a 7-1 vote;

  • a rally called by the newly formed Save Our City Coalition (SOCC) at the historic Empress Hotel on January 6; 1,200 people packed the hall, hundreds signed a petition addressed to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and many donated funds to support their cause;

  • a recall on January 15 of the December 18 decision of Council by the Mayor for a period of six weeks, during which a specially appointed Development Commissioner sought solutions to outstanding issues which were to be acceptable to the City, the developer and concerned citizens;

  • the formation in January of an unlikely but effective coalition of two major business organizations and two major labour groups under the banner of Put Victoria First. This group distributed leaflets and bumper stickers and sponsored newspaper and radio advertising in support of the project; it raised over $5,000 in donations from individuals and organizations to fund these activities;

  • two further issues of the Victoria Eaton Centre Newsletter were distributed to some 3,000 people with updated information about the project; the final issue featured the most recent architectural revisions, including height reductions, and a reply-paid postcard addressed to the Mayor and Council;

  • endorsements of the project by a dozen business and community leaders were aired in radio and television advertisements sponsored by the proponent;

  • another SOCC rally of 750 people at the Royal Theatre on February 23 heard former Mayor of Toronto John Sewell, a long-time foe of the Toronto Eaton Centre; a former mayor of Victoria and others deplore the project;

  • a telephone survey sponsored by the B.C. Public Interest Research Group reported 45% supported the project, 20% were neutral and 33% opposed it;

  • media coverage from December 11 to March 9 included 2,400 column inches in the newspapers and considerable radio, TV and cablevision broadcasting;

  • a Council meeting was held to receive the report of the special Development Commissioner who negotiated some changes in the final design but was unable to achieve the consensus amongst all the parties sought by the Mayor;

  • 1,500 coupons, most favouring the project, were presented to Mayor and Council on March 4, in addition they received directly 486 postcards of which 449 (92%) supported the project;

  • two more evening Council meetings, which were convened in the Royal Theatre to accommodate the numbers, were held featuring brief position statements by group leaders and individuals before a 7-2 vote to approve the project took place on March 9.

Notwithstanding the concerted opposition campaign, the 2-to-1 level of general public support for the project remained remarkably stable for the previous three months. In November, support versus opposition (removing the undecideds) was 85 : 15; December = 80 : 20; January = 65 : 35; February = 65 : 35; March = 65 : 35.

In the weeks and months which followed final approval, remaining design issues were gradually resolved, e.g. compensation for heritage buildings, parkette additions, and further detailed design drawings were generated until initial development and building permits were finally issued in August.

Observations and Conclusions
  1. While initially it was proposed to focus the program on the residents of the City of Victoria, it soon became clear that the Mayor and Council were interested in hearing from all the citizens of Greater Victoria.

  2. Many substantial changes from current retail design practices resulted from public input to the project. These include:

    • a building subdivided into many different elements, e.g. individual storefronts, a varied roofline and different window treatments;

    • provision of parking under the Centre;

    • reduced building heights;

    • substantial areas of individual street-related retail, i.e. not simply "back doors" to mall stores;

    • sensitivity to heritage values within the constraints of project design, e.g. architectural treatment of Douglas and Government Street frontages, reconstruction of several facades of key buildings; partial retention of the facades of the Driard Hotel and the Times building, financed by the City by an innovative tax rebate scheme in the amount of $1.2 million;

    • continuation of Broad Street as a quasi-public walkway through the Centre.

  3. This project would not have won approval without the concerted effort of the Put Victoria First group. Despite their traditional differences, the major business and labour organizations in the city forged a powerful and effective alliance. Their leaders and a handful of other committed individuals met every Wednesday to plan strategy and coordinate activities. The group was independent of the proponent in its leadership and financing, although project staff were available to it when requested.

  4. Many have remarked on the intensity of the opposition to the project especially between mid-December and early March, particularly the intense telephone campaign directed to the Mayor and Council during the last month of that period. One of the main factors responsible, I believe, is that the public information and consultation program upset some traditional patterns of influence in the decision-making process.

    Many of those opposed to the project were accustomed to being influential in civic decisions through their personal and informal representations to the Mayor and aldermen who frequently did not hear from much of the general population, i.e. the silent majority. Our public program encouraged a whole new set of participants who usurped the roles of many of the accustomed influentials and brought conflicting viewpoints to bear on the elected representatives. Thus some of those who devoted hundreds of hours to opposing the project may have been seeking, consciously or otherwise, to re-establish their power and influence over the political process.

  5. From another perspective, this public information and consultation program was an exercise in enfranchising the silent majority. We knew from regular telephone surveys and the coupons and postcards mailed in that a solid 2:1 majority supported the Victoria Eaton Centre. The challenge was to ensure that this supportive majority was heard over the noisy protests of the organized and articulate minority.

Some Lessons Learned
Out of this experience, the following insights have been drawn:

  1. Obtain a systematic understanding of the community before commencing any activities in it.

  2. Design a consistent process which will:

    • present relevant and understandable information;

    • solicit useful comments and suggestions about it;

    • use the public input to revise and refine the proposal to increase the benefits to the community and minimize negative effects on it.

  3. Match the elements in the public process to the phases of the project development sequence.

  4. Focus on the latent and secondary beneficiaries, i.e. the five-volt positive people. Identify, interest, inform and involve them and have them deal with the opposition - enfranchise the silent majority.

  5. Do not spend more than 20% of your resources - time, energy, goodwill, money - on trying to deal directly with the opposition; invest instead in potential supporters. Note: this 15 month program cost some $150,000.

  6. Once a significant part of the community "owns" the project, foster its powerful problem-solving and decision-making processes, rather than act independently.

  7. Listen continuously to the various voices in the community and respond to them quickly.

  8. Select processes appropriate for the different publics, e.g. a simple information-feedback process with the general public, a consultation process with group leaders and joint planning with the municipality and other jurisdictions.

  9. Realize that after an effective public participation process, citizens are likely to demand similar opportunities from local government and other developers.

  10. The basic equation in this process is: Community analysis + two-way information + developer response = Community support + political approval + Community development.


EPILOGUE

Since I wrote and published the case study: The Victoria Eaton Centre: The Dynamics of Heritage and Change in Urban Redevelopment, in June of 1988, much has happened. Phase One, the new premises for Eaton's and many street retail shops, opened in February 1989 and Phase Two opened in August 1990.

After Phase One opened, I called and/or visited ten community leaders who played prominent roles in the planning and decision-making process recounted in the case study. My basic question was: "As you look back on this experience, what lessons should be learned from it?"

Since some of those interviewed did not wish to be identified, I have grouped the replies under three categories:

The Heritage Community
Many in the heritage community still feel angry, bitter and disillusioned with the political process; they feel they lost the battle.

"Heritage is not mimic buildings, not facades, not heritage construction; we would have preferred a building reflecting the best in modern design."

"Council should not make secret deals with developers; should have more respect for community views and fully use the volunteer expertise in the community."

"The legacy of bitterness has imposed a high social cost on the community - there must be a better way."

"More substantial market and engineering studies should have been made by the developer."

"There had been an unspoken moral contract between local developers and Council about the scale of development - Cadillac Fairview broke it."

"Heritage interests were defeated by a quiescent Planning Department, a disinterested daily newspaper, a decision by the Province not to get involved, a weak Hallmark Society and the limited support given to Save Our City. Neither organization tried to problem-solve with Cadillac Fairview."

"This process lead to current apathy and disillusionment with the political process-the legal route is the only one left."

"A history of internal dissension limited the ability of the heritage community to work together. If we could have agreed on a single leader, we could have mounted a much more professional and effective campaign."

"The City of Victoria needs a constantly up-dated plan for its physical development and social well-being - and then respect that plan. It should invoke the public more effectively and use its input honestly. We must strive to recruit the very best candidates to run for municipal office and serve on advisory committees."

The Business Community
"The new building is a far better neighbour than its depressing predecessor; it is not out of scale for the area. We did not want a modern building but one that fit into the environment."

"While they did an excellent job in minimizing the disruption of the construction period, we are disturbed at the failure to fulfil commitments to the exterior finish."

"The Victoria Eaton Centre has been the catalyst for further investment nearby in heritage restoration and in new development. It is proving to be a magnet for the downtown core."

"Heritage people should try to be more constructive and pro-active. Politicians should beware of stereotyping all developers with the same evil assumptions. Citizens should become more informed and involved."

"If you want good things for your community, get together with others and work toward the better community!"

"The Centre is already proving worthwhile for small business in the downtown."

"Heritage issues can be taken too far - the directly affected business community should be given more consideration. City Council should be more decisive."

"The public process resulted in a better project and higher public interest which will be good for business. No-one could ask for more public input; everything that could have been done was done. Yet still some people put their heads in the sand - the fanatical fringe. How do you get them to listen? Politicians have an unenviable lot; there are too many splinter groups - how consolidate them ?"

Some Alderpersons
"In retrospect, it can be seen that by permitting Cadillac Fairview to set the agenda, determine the timetable and control the flow of information about the project, council allowed citizens' faith in their government to be corroded and the integrity of the public process to be undermined."

"People did not believe Cadillac Fairview initially when they offered to develop the concept for the Centre with the community - they felt sure they had a plan in their hip pocket. Later, through Peter Picherack, much respect was developed and the company became part of the community through its actions."

"A special Citizen Advisory Board would have been more useful than the Special Development Commissioner."

"Heritage people lose credibility by spreading misinformation."

"Council should have had a more open process from the beginning - now we have no more closed door meetings with developers. Never underestimate the interest of the public in these issues. They are becoming more articulate and sophisticated in design issues."

"Politicians need to articulate heritage conservation objectives and design parameters more clearly."

The Special Development Commissioner
Mr. Gwyn Symmons, the Special Development Commissioner, feels that his role in this project is inadequately presented in this case study - over 2,000 people visited his store-front office; he met with dozens of groups, reduced the level of conflict and negotiated significant improvements in the final project.

He believes that the process failed to reach out enough to those in opposition, and indeed led to more opposition.

Council should have its own public information and consultation process for a major development like this; should not leave it to the developer.

The heritage community needs to be better organized to preserve more of the existing buildings, should be more flexible and should reach outside the community for expertise and resources.

Reference
Connor, D.M., Constructive Citizen Participation: A Resource Book, Development Press, Victoria, B.C., Sixth Edition 1997; 200+ pp.; $30.00; 250-658-1323

Acknowledgements
The writer is grateful to the Cadillac Fairview Corporation for its support of this program and permission to make this case study public. Valued comments and suggestions have been received from Mr. Peter Picherack, Vice-President of Cadillac Fairview and Mr. David Thom, Director of the IBI Group. However, the case study is the responsibility of the writer and does not imply their approval or the support of the Cadillac Fairview Corporation for any of the opinions expressed. Comments and suggestions on this case study are warmly invited.

The Epilogue was presented at a Heritage Canada Symposium held in Kingston, Ont., September 14-17, 1989.

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DESMOND M. CONNOR
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407-5332 Sayward Hill Crescent, Victoria, BC, V8Y 2H8
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